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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: JUDICIAL REVIEW-
REFLECTIONS ON THE PROPER RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN COURTS AND AGENCIES
GERALD E. BERENDT*
WALTER J. KENDALL III**
Since the inception of the nation, the legislative and executive
branches of government in this country have found it necessary to dele-
gate substantial power to administrative agencies in order to solve a
wide range of problems.' Throughout this period, the courts have
played an important role in insuring that these delegates of administra-
tive authority perform their functions as envisioned by the creating en-
tity without straying beyond the limits of their authority or abusing the
sometimes broad discretion afforded them.2 The relationship between
the judiciary and the agencies has been a changing one, and recently
the courts have exhibited an inclination to assume a more active role in
reviewing the substance of agency decisions.3 This changing relation-
ship and the judicial attitudes effecting it constitute the major focus of
this survey of administrative law cases issued by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit during its 1980-81 term.
A variety of reasons have been offered for the creation of adminis-
trative agencies.4 In the case of some quasi-adjudicatory agencies, such
as the Social Security Administration, the agency is created in part to
relieve the courts of the overwhelming workload caused by burgeoning
litigation in a specific area.5 In addition, an agency may be given re-
sponsibility to pursue and foster policies which the legislature believes
* Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School; LL.M., New York University Law
School; J.D., University of South Carolina School of Law; member of the Labor Panel of the
American Arbitration Association.
* Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School; J.D., St. John's University School of
Law; A.B., Brooklyn College. The authors wish to extend their appreciation to Deborah Gorsky,
a law student at The John Marshall Law School, for her assistance in preparing this survey.
I. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 26 (3d ed. 1972).
2. See generally Wright, Beyond Dircretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C.Cir. 1978); Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson,
499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 29.01-2 (Cum. Supp.
1980).
4. See W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 2-7 (6th
ed. 1974).
5. See id at7.
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would receive less favorable treatment from the judiciary. 6 In some
cases, the legislature delegates responsibility for a given area of public
concern to a body of experts whose specialization, experience and
training better enable them to deal with complex or technical
problems.7 In many cases, treatment of a problem is necessary but not
possible if left to the traditional branches of government. 8 Similarly,
some areas of regulation require continuous, daily attention for which
the legislatures and courts are rU-equipped. 9 Regardless of the specific
reason or reasons in a given case, agencies are created to deal with
problems of public concern which cannot be handled effectively by our
traditional branches of government.' 0
Although the administrative entity is a practical necessity in many
situations, it is not free to operate without limitation. In addition to the
strictures imposed by our federal and state constitutions, most enabling
statutes confine the agency to a given area of activity. Although the
agency's authority to act within that area might appear to be quite
broad, the exercise of agency discretion is often subject to judicial re-
view as provided in the enabling legislation." In some situations, the
courts have accorded agency decisions great deference, while in others
the courts have been inclined to scrutinize closely agency action.
In recent years, the judiciary has exhibited a growing willingness
to engage in a thorough and searching analysis of the substance of
agency decisions, even those involving technical and complex matters
previously believed best left to the agency experts.' 2 This trend is due
in some measure to the impact of certain decisions of the United States
Supreme Court.13 Nevertheless, increasing judicial willingness to ques-
tion agency decisions has undermined the precedential value of older,
previously unassailed Supreme Court decisions' 4 and has caused a
growing tension between the agencies and the courts.' 5 A large portion
of this article is devoted to a survey of cases issued by the Seventh
6. See id
7. See id at 5.
8. See id at 3.
9. See id at 5.
10. See id at 3.
11. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1976), providing for judicial review of final orders of the
National Labor Relations Board.
12. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
13. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974); Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
14. E.g. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); NLRB v. Hearst Publica-
tions, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill (1944).
15. Greanis & Windsor, Is Judicial Restraint Possible in an Admninstrative Society, 64 JUDI-
CATURE 400 (1981).
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Circuit which illustrate this trend and its exceptions. The opinions ex-
hibit a lack of consistency due probably to uncertainty as to the proper
principles to be applied in determining the intensity of judicial review
of agency decisions. A reevaluation of the respective roles of agencies
and judiciary is needed; in large measure, the problem can be solved by
the legislative branch providing specific guidelines as to substantive
standards, procedural requirements and scope of review to be applied
by the courts.
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In the course of administrative decisionmaking, whether quasi-
adjudicatory or less formal, agencies make findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. Traditionally, it has been maintained that a reviewing
court is free to question agency conclusions of law but may not reopen
factual issues resolved by the agency.' 6 Although the distinction be-
tween questions of law and questions of fact remains fundamental to
the proper exercise of judicial review, the complete separation of ques-
tions of law and fact suggested by the traditional approach is not possi-
ble in all cases and would, in any event, be overly simplistic and
undesirable.
To the extent they can be identified in a given case, questions of
law include matters relating to the common law, statutory interpreta-
tion, constitutional law, administrative jurisdiction, administrative pro-
cedure, and protection against arbitrary or capricious action or abuse
of agency discretion.' 7 Although a reviewing court is generally free to
substitute its views with respect to such questions of law for those of the
agency, such de novo review is not always appropriate. When an
agency applies a broad statutory term to a given set of facts, it decides a
"mixed question," but it is surely interpreting the statutory term in the
process. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,18 the Supreme Court
instructed that in such a situation the reviewing court's jurisdiction is
limited and that the agency's determination is to be accepted if it has
"'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in the law."' 9 Under
this "rational basis" test, a reviewing court is not free to decide the legal
issue de novo, but must narrow the scope of its review to determine
whether the agency's application of the law was reasonable. If it was
reasonable, the court must defer to the agency. The Hearst test recog-
16. C. CARR, CONCERNING ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 108 (1941).
17. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExT 525 (3d ed. 1972).
18. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
19. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
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nizes that, in some situations, Congress intended that specialized and
experienced experts define the law within broad statutory parameters
without excessive judicial second guessing. 20 Accordingly, agency reso-
lutions of legal issues are generally subject to broad, de novo review
when reviewable, but the judicial review may be narrowed considera-
bly where the agency has decided a mixed question (law applied to
facts) or where a purely legal issue requires the attention of the
agency's specialized experts.
Although the simple distinction of the traditional appoach would
leave issues of fact resolved by the agency undisturbed by judicial re-
view, such has not been the case in our federal system. The Adminis-
trative Procedure Act 2' sets forth the standards courts are to apply
when reviewing both agency factfmding and conclusions of law. In Cit-
izens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Vo/pe, the Supreme Court ex-
plained the application of these standards:
In all cases agency action must be set aside if the action was "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law" or if the action failed to meet statutory, procedural or
constitutional requirements. In certain narrow, specifically limited
situations, the agency action is to be set aside if the action was not
supported by "substantial evidence." And in equally narrow circum-
stances the reviewing court is to engage in de novo review of the
action and set it aside if it was "unwarranted by the facts."'22
The Court explained further that the substantial evidence standard is
applied only "when the agency action is taken pursuant to a rulemak-
ing provision of the Administrative Procedure Act itself, or when the
20. See, e.g., Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975).
21. Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and deter-
mine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court
shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authorization, or limitations, or short
of statutory right;
(D) without observation of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and
557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing pro-
vided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those
parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
22. 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971) (citations omitted).
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agency action is based on a public adjudicatory hearing. ' 23 Thus if
agency findings of fact are drawn from a record of an agency hearing
provided for by statute, those findings must be supported by substantial
evidence from that record taken as a whole.24 De novo review25 "is
appropriate only where there are inadequate factfinding procedures in
an adjudicatory proceeding, or where judicial proceedings are brought
to enforce certain administrative actions. ' 26 In cases where agency
findings are not made on a hearing record and in which there is no
deficiency in factfinding procedures, the appropriate standard for re-
view is whether the adjudication is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'27
During the period covered by this survey, the Seventh Circuit is-
sued several noteworthy decisions which raise the question of the judi-
ciary's role in reviewing agency action. In some cases, the court
reviewed agency action with little or no discussion of the intensity of its
scrutiny,28 while in others it directly addressed this vexing problem.29
In one case, Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA,30 the court noted that the
parties had not directly addressed the question of what standard of re-
view was appropriate and that the statute in question did not resolve
the issue. 3' In other words, the court was called upon to determine the
proper standard of review without guidance from the parties or from
Congress. This situation is typical of the confusion that prevails with
respect to the determination of a proper standard of judicial review of
agency actions.
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA
The essential facts in Bethlehem Steel were not in dispute.32 The
Federal Clean Air Act 3 3 authorizes the United States Environmental
23. Id. at 414 (citations omitted).
24. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1976).
26. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).
27. Id.
28. Eg., Green Bay & W. R.R. Co. v. ICC, 644 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981); Dodson v. Na-
tional Transp. Safety Bd., 644 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1981); Carver v. Harris, 634 F.2d 363 (7th Cir.
1980); NLRB v. Pfizer, Inc., 629 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1980); Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v.
ICC, 629 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1980); Featherston v. Stanton, 626 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1980); Harvey v.
Seevers, 626 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1980).
29. Illinois v. United States, 666 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1981); Stein's Inc. v. Blumenthal, 649
F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1980); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 638 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1980).
30. 638 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1980).
31. Id at 1003.
32. Id at 996.
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. III 1979).
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Protection Agency (EPA) to establish nationwide air quality standards,
but leaves to the states the responsibility for taking steps necessary to
achieve those standards. 34 Once the EPA approves a state's implemen-
tation plan, the state may issue orders delaying the dates by which par-
ticular regulated entities are required to comply with the
implementation plan.35
In 1972, Indiana submitted to the EPA an implementation plan
which included a 1968 air pollution control regulation limiting visible
emissions from "combustion" operations. 36 In 1974, Indiana amended
the regulation to extend its prescriptions to "any" operations, including
batteries of coke ovens such as those operated by Bethlehem Steel in
Burns Harbor, Indiana. 37 In 1975, the EPA Administrator issued his
final determination, expressing dissatisfaction with several aspects of
the 1974 revision, including its allowance of a fifteen-minute exemption
from compliance in each twenty-four hour period for certain opera-
tions, including coke batteries. 38 The Administrator disapproved the
state air pollution control regulation "to the extent that the fifteen-
minute exemption provision. . . fails to meet the requirements" of the
EPA regulations, but he specifically noted that otherwise "the proposed
revisions meet the [agency's] substantive and procedural
requirements. '39
On November 15, 1978, the Indiana Air Pollution Control Board
issued a Delayed Compliance Order.4 The order indicated that Beth-
lehem Steel was possibly violating the state's visible emissions regula-
tion, but granted the steel company an extension of time within which
to bring its operations into full compliance with the regulation.41 The
Indiana Board asserted that it notified the federal EPA of its intent to
enforce this Delayed Compliance Order on November 15, 1978, but the
EPA maintained it did not receive adequate notice until December 26,
1978. Since the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to approve or disap-
prove such orders within ninety days of their receipt of notice of the
issuance, 42 the correct date was crucial in this case, as the EPA released
34. Id §§ 7401(a)(3), 7410(a).
35. Id § 7413(d).
36. Indiana Air Pollution Control Regulation (1968 APC-3) (current version codified at 325
IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-3-1 to 1-3-4 (1979)).
37. 638 F.2d at 997.
38. 40 Fed. Reg. 50,032-33 (1975).
39. Id
40. 638 F.2d at 998.
41. Id Under the Delayed Compliance Order, Bethlehem was to bring its coke operations
into full compliance with the state implementation plan by July 1, 1979.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2) (1976).
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its proposed disapproval on March 17, 1979. 43
The EPA Administrator's final disapproval" of the Delayed Com-
pliance Order cited several deficiencies in that order, including the Ad-
ministrator's impression that the order only called for Bethlehem's
"best effort," that the state agency had in essence agreed not to enforce
if there were violations, and that the program proposed in the order
was not sufficient to control emissions. The Administrator also noted
that the state regulation cited in the order was not the regulation ap-
proved by the EPA in 1975, but the less stringent version promulgated
by the state agency in 1968.45
On December 21, 1978, the EPA instituted an enforcement pro-
ceeding against Bethlehem Steel for noncompliance with the state's im-
plementation plan. Thereafter, Bethlehem Steel petitioned the Seventh
Circuit for review of the EPA Administrator's disapproval of the state's
Delayed Compliance Order. Bethlehem maintained that the Adminis-
trator was without statutory authority to issue partial approvals of state
implementation plans. Thus, the EPA's 1975 determination must be
interpreted as a complete disapproval of the pollution control regula-
tion revision proposed by the state, leaving the less stringent 1968 regu-
lation as the only enforceable standard governing visible emissions.
Bethlehem Steel asserted, therefore, that the Administrator's disap-
proval of the Delayed Compliance Order was incorrect. In addition,
the company argued that the EPA improperly instituted its civil action
since the statute provides that no federal enforcement action may be
pursued during the period a Delayed Compliance Order is in effect and
the operator is in compliance with the order.46 Finally, Bethlehem
maintained that EPA procedure in reviewing the state order failed to
comply with provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 47 and due
process requirements because the EPA attorneys in charge of the en-
forcement action were the same attorneys who reviewed the order
pending the enforcement action. According to the company, this was
an improper commingling of adjudicative and prosecutorial
functions.48
In addressing these issues, the court first considered the question of
43. 638 F.2d at 998. The final disapproval of the Delayed Compliance Order was not issued
until September 17, 1979, two and one-half months after the date by which Bethlehem was re-
quired to be in full compliance with the state implementation plan. Id
44. 44 Fed. Reg. 53,746-48 (1979).
45. 638 F.2d at 1007.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(10) (1976).
47. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 556 (1976).
48. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
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whether the EPA Administrator disapproved the Delayed Compliance
Order within the ninety day period prescribed in the Clean Air Act.
The Court rejected the Administrator's contention that he had satisfied
the statutory mandate when he issued his proposed disapproval,
thereby notifying the parties of his rejection of the Delayed Compli-
ance Order.49 The court noted that the statute clearly states: "The Ad-
ministrator shall determine, not later than 90 days, after receipt of notice
of the issuance of the [order] . . . whether or not the [order] is in ac-
cordance with the requirements of this section."50 The court com-
mented that the Administrator's proffered interpretation of the statute
manifested "poor policy considerations" in addition to lacking support
in the statute itself, since such an interpretation would undermine
delayed compliance orders by permitting the Administrator to delay
final approval or disapproval indefinitely.5 I Having resolved that issue,
the court turned to the merits of the EPA's disapproval.5 2
The court prefaced its review of the merits of the Administrator's
action by considering the proper standard of judicial review and re-
marked that neither the parties nor the statute addressed this issue.53
Drawing upon judicial interpretations of related sections of the Clean
Air Act,54 the Seventh Circuit reached the conclusion that the Adminis-
trator's decision to disapprove the Delayed Compliance Order should
be vacated only if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law."'55 Although it referred to this
test as a "relatively liberal standard of review," 56 the court warned that
the Administrator must "publish a statement of reasons that will be
sufficiently detailed to permit judicial review, and even under the 'arbi-
49. The agency argued that its actions in filing the civil enforcement action and in publishing
its proposed disapproval of the Delayed Compliance Order put Bethlehem on notice of the
agency's intention to disapprove the order, thus fulfilling the purpose and intent of the statutory
requirement. 638 F.2d at 1001.
50. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (1976)) (emphasis supplied by the court).
51. 638 F.2d at 1001.
52. Id at 1002.
53. Id at 1003.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)-(3) (1976).
55. This standard of review is found at 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976) and applies to review of
all agency actions. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14
(1971). The court declined to accept Bethlehem's characterization of the agency's action as adju-
dicatory, noting that the statute fails to require a public hearing prior to the action. Thus, the
"supported by substantial evidence" standard set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) is inapplicable.
See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). See generally Stewart, The Devel-
opmemn of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review ofEnvironmental Deci-
sionmaking. Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. Rav. 713, 729-33 (1977); Pederson,
Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38 (1975).
56. 638 F.2d at 1004.
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trary, capricious' standard agency action will not be upheld where in-
adequacy of explanation frustrates review."'57
Elaborating on the agency's responsibility to set forth clearly the
basis of its action, the court observed that secrecy, intentional or inad-
vertent, was not consistent with the proper execution of administrative
responsibility and declared that "[t]he record of agency decision must
demonstrate and reflect the exercise by the Administrator of 'reasoned
discretion' and not simply manifest a 'crystal ball inquiry.'"58 The
court concluded that two of the Administrator's published bases for
rejecting the state agency's Delayed Compliance Order failed to meet
this test. The court found no explanation for the Administrator's rejec-
tion of the state's finding that technological controls do not exist,59 and
it deemed "inadequate" the administrator's "summary explanation"
that he was simply "not satisfied" with parts of the state order.60 Refer-
ring to the "unknown basis for the Agency's action," the court stated,
"Courts require that administrative agencies 'articulate the criteria' em-
ployed in reaching their result and are no longer content with bare ad-
ministrative ipse dixit based upon supposed administrative expertise."'61
Another of the bases offered by the Administrator for rejecting the
state order was that the order failed to require compliance because it
permitted Bethlehem to challenge the technological feasibility of the
state regulations in an enforcement proceeding.62 The court rejected
this objection on the ground that the agency could not require Bethle-
hem to waive this defense in order to obtain EPA approval of the or-
der.63 The court rejected other reasons given by the Administrator on
the ground that the Administrator was "second-guessing the state's
chosen mix of enforcement tools," thereby abusing his discretion by
interfering with the state's primary role as envisioned in the statute.64
The court also rejected the last of the Administrator's objections:
that the state had cited the less stringent 1968 pollution control regula-
tion rather than the partially-approved 1974 version.65 Assuming argu-
endo that the Administrator had authority to approve revisions
57. Id. (quoting National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir.
1975)) (citations omitted).
58. 638 F.2d at 1004.
59. Id
60. Id at 1005.
61. Id (quoting Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 507 (4th Cir. 1973)). See also
Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
62. 638 F.2d at 1005.
63. Id
64. Id at 1006.
65. Id at 1008.
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partially, the court concluded that the record did not support his con-
tention that he did so in this case. In addition, even if he did partially
approve the 1974 revisions, the record did not establish that the state
actually applied the wrong regulation.66 The court concluded:
[Iln short, the record is inadequate to allow this court effectively to
review the Administrator's action. . . . It would seem the state in-
tended to apply the [regulation] the Administrator wishes enforced,
yet he has boldly concluded otherwise. Without some support in the
record, we cannot accept this as an adequate basis for the Adminis-
trator's decision.67
Finally, the court considered Bethlehem's contention that the
EPA's internal procedures impermissibly combined investigative and
adjudicative functions in the same attorneys. Although it concluded
that the agency's procedures did not violate the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 68 the court noted that the due process clause of the United
States Constitution "requires fundamental fairness to be respected in
agency proceedings. ' 69 The court acknowledged that the agency en-
joys "certain presumptions of regularity," 70 but concluded that in this
case sufficient questions of propriety had been raised to require a re-
mand. Accordingly, the court vacated the Administrator's decision and
remanded to the agency for further proceedings. 71
The court's opinion in Bethlehem Steel is an example of the grow-
ing judicial inclination to scrutinize more closely agency action re-
viewed under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.72 Although the
court referred to this standard of review as "relatively liberal, ' 73 its
application of this standard was certainly "a thorough, probing, in
depth review" such as that envisioned by the Supreme Court in Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Vo~le.74 Moreover, the court's charac-
terization of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard as "relatively lib-
eral," presumably when compared with the substantial evidence test, 75
seemingly differs from the view of other members of the court who sat
on the panel which decided Illinois v. United States76 during the period
of this survey. In the latter case, the majority consisting of Judge
66. Id
67. Id
68. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 556 (1976).
69. 638 F.2d at 1009 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975)).
70. 638 F.2d at 1010.
71. Id
72. See, e.g., cases cited note 3 supra.
73. 638 F.2d at 1004.
74. 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1972).
75. See note 55 supra.
76. 666 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1981).
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Sprecher and Chief Judge Fairchild suggested that the difference in the
review standards may be primarily semantic. 77
Illinois v. United States
In Illinois v. United States,78 the Seventh Circuit reviewed a deci-
sion of the Federal Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) allowing
the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad to abandon a railroad line. The panel
majority concluded that the ICC decision was arbitrary and
capricious. 79
Before reviewing the merits of the ICC's final decision, the court
considered which standard of review was appropriate. Noting that the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard applies in all cases, the court found
it less clear whether the substantial evidence test should also be ap-
plied. The latter standard governs cases "reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute."80 The court's inspection of the
railroad abandonment statutes8' revealed that the ICC was not required
to hold hearings in abandonment cases, and thus the court concluded
that application of the substantial evidence test was not required.8 2 In
a footnote, the court suggested, "[I]t may be that the difference in re-
view standards is primarily semantic. ' 83 The court then explained the
requirements of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. The court
emphasized that the agency must clearly set forth its grounds for acting,
77. Id at 1072 n.6. This view is apparently shared by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. See Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265, 271-72 n.15 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
78. 666 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1981).
79. Id at 1077-80.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). Section 706 is quoted in full at note 21 supra. See also text
accompanying notes 16-27 supra.
81. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10903-10904 (1976).
82. 666 F.2d at 1072. The petitioners had argued that, in addition to being arbitrary and
capricious, the ICC's final decision was unsupported by substantial evidence. Id at 1071. The
ICC did not contest the applicability of that standard. Id at 1072. The court noted that in a
recent railroad abandonment case, the reviewing court had applied the substantial evidence test
without any explanation, see Concord Township v. United States, 625 F.2d 1068, 1072-73 (3d Cir.
1980), but concluded on the basis of its own analysis that the applicability of that standard was
doubtful and declined to use it. 666 F.2d at 1072.
83. Id at 1072 n.6. The court stated further:
As a matter of practicability, it may not much matter how reviewing courts choose to
label the tests they apply. Labels, experience tells us, seldom have much analytical util-
ity and just as often may lead judges into a semantic Serbonian Bog. While an adverse
action supported by substantial evidence of record may still be arbitrary or capricious
... an action that is not arbitrary or capricious logically must have some if not substan-
tial evidentiary support in the record.
Id (quoting Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265, 271 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (citations omitted). The
allusion is to Paradise Lost where John Milton referred to "a gulf profound as that Serbonian Bog
Betwixt Damiata and mount Casius old, where armies whole have sunk."
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that any judicial deference for administrative expertise and presump-
tions favorable to the agency will not prevent "a thorough, probing, in-
depth review," and that the court will "take into account all relevant
factors." 85 The court elaborated that the scope of review is relatively
narrow, though nonetheless "searching and careful. '8 6 While the court
is not free to substitute its judgment for the agency's, it "must consider
whether the ICC's decision 'was based on a consideration of the rele-
vant factors and whether there were any clear errors of judgment.' "87
The court indicated that when the agency's decision is adjudicative, it
"must clearly address the specific legal and factual issues raised. ' 88 In
addition, the agency must "clearly explain the nature and rationale of
its differing conclusion"8' 9 if its final decision differs from its factfinder's
decision.
In applying the standard of review it described as appropriate, the
court was highly critical of the ICC's decision on two principal
grounds. First, the ICC opinion gave no explanation for its reversal of
the agency factfinder's decision. 90 Second, the court found the ICC's
failure to address the issues raised by the parties opposing the railway
abandonment application rendered the decision arbitrary and capri-
cious.91 For these reasons, the panel majority vacated the final ICC
decision and remanded the proceeding to the ICC for further
proceedings.92
In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Judge Fairchild indicated
that even in the absence of other factors he would conclude the deci-
sion was "an inadequate demonstration that factual material was prop-
erly addressed and choices rationally made within the range of
84. 666 F.2d at 1073 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
415 (1971)).
85. 666 F.2d at 1073 (quoting National Crushed Stone Ass'n v. EPA, 601 F.2d 111, 116 (4th
Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 64 (1980)).
86. 666 F.2d at 1073 (quoting Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419
U.S. 281, 285 (1974)).
87. 666 F.2d at 1073.
88. Id (citing Harborlite Corp. v. ICC, 613 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
89. 666 F.2d at 1073 (citing NLRB v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 1057, 1058 (7th Cir.
1978)). In this case, the initial hearing had been held before an administrative law judge who had
denied the railroad's abandonment application. When the railroad appealed, the ICC accepted
the law judge's factual determination, but rejected his conclusion that the railroad's financial bur-
den in operating the line was less substantial than the impairment to public convenience that
would result from the line's abandonment. 666 F.2d at 1075-76.
90. Id at 1076-77.
91. Id at 1076-80. Additionally, the court concluded that supplementary evidence which the
ICC had received and considered should have been subject to cross-examination. The court em-
phasized the "narrowness" of this conclusion since it resulted from the particular factors of the
case. Id at 1083.
92. Id
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administrative discretion. ' 93 Any presumption of administrative pro-
priety was overcome by "the several stage history of this proceeding" 94
and significant gaps in the ICC's decision.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Swygert expressed his satisfaction
that the ICC had provided a sufficient explanation for its decision. Re-
ferring to the court's responsibility to review the decision, he submitted:
Our task, however, is not to require that agencies always write
lengthy opinions which explain every finding or rebut every argu-
ment made by the losing side. Particularly in a case such as this in
which the final determination involves a balancing of interests, our
purpose should be to ensure that the findings-and the ultimate con-
clusion-are justified by a sufficient basis in the record.95
Judge Swygert took issue with the majority's view that the ICC's
explanation was conclusory and failed to respond to specific arguments
made by those who opposed the abandonment. He maintained that
"[i]t is not the Commission's responsibility to counter every argument
put forward by the parties in each case, particularly where, as here,
there is more than adequate support for the finding in the record. '96
Judge Swygert noted that the majority's expectation that the agency
specifically address all issues raised by the parties places too large a
burden on the ICC:
Where the Commission, as here, explains the reasons for its action,
and where there is sufficient evidence in the record to support those
reasons, no more should be necessary. The Commission should not
have to respond to all the contentions normally raised in a shotgun
approach under such circumstances. . . The Commission has
presented a reasoned decision that fairly addresses the issues in this
case. Its reasons for the decision are clear, and they are amply sup-
ported by the record. It has articulated a "rational connection be-
tween the facts found and the choice made." The mere fact that the
Commission did not counter every argument raised by the contes-
tants is not sufficient ground to reverse its decision. The Commis-
sion's authority in determining issues of public convenience and
necessity is broad, and the scope ofjudicial review is correspondingly
narrow.
97
Judge Swygert concluded that those who opposed the ICC's decision
had not met their burden of showing that the decision was "unjust and
93. Id at 1083 (Fairchild, C.J., concurring).
94. Id at 1084.
95. Id (Swygert, J., dissenting).
96. Id (footnote omitted).
97. Id at 1086-87 (citations and footnotes omitted). Judge Swygert also commented that the
agency should not be required to rebut every contrary finding made by its factfinder. Id. at 1086
n.12.
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unreasonable in its consequences. '98
The wide divergence of views as to the appropriate intensity of
scrutiny between the majority and Judge Swygert further points out the
confusion among the judiciary concerning proper standards of judicial
review in given cases. The judges have differed over characterization
of issues, choice of standards of review, the definition of particular
standards, and the intensity of scrutiny when applying a given stan-
dard. A consensus should be reached, although it is unlikely that the
judiciary will do so. Accordingly, these are matters properly within the
responsibility of the legislature which should consider the many in-
sightful judicial opinions on these questions. Apparently, the courts
are ready for such direction. In sum, the judiciary, litigants, and most
important the public, are entitled to clarification as to the court's proper
function in reviewing agency action.
Other Standards of Review
During the period of the survey, the Seventh Circuit issued several
other decisions dealing with problems of determining the proper scope
of judicial review. 99 In Stein's Inc. v. Blumenthal,1°° the plaintiff, a
pawnbroker, appealed the Secretary of the Treasury's denial of his ap-
plication to renew a license to deal in firearms. The federal district
court affirmed the denial, and the plaintiff appealed on the ground that
the Gun Control Act of 1968101 required the district court to try the
case de novo rather than rely upon the administrative record. The
court of appeals affirmed the district court declaring "we do not under-
stand [the legislative] history to require the district court to hold a hear-
ing and receive evidence beyond that contained in the administrative
record in every case."' 0 2 The court concluded that the district court has
the discretion to receive additional evidence if it believes there is good
reason to do so. The Seventh Circuit held that although the statute
requires "de novo review," it does not require a "trial de novo" in
every case. A new trial would only be appropriate where "substantial
98. Id at 1087 (quoting ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 512 (1950)).
99. Garvey Grain Co. v. Director of Workers' Compensation Programs, 639 F.2d 366 (7th
Cir. 1981); Midwest Stock Exch., Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Mars
Sales & Equip. Co., 626 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1980); Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23 (7th
Cir. 1980); Stein's Inc. v. Blumenthal, 649 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1980).
100. 649 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1980).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 923(0(3) (1976).
102. 649 F.2d at 466.
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doubt infects the agency's findings of fact."' 10 3 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court emphasized the lack of congressional guidelines and
considerations of judicial economy and fairness. Convinced that the
district court engaged in a de novo review of the Secretary's determina-
tion, the court majority upheld the district court's affirmance of that
decision. 104
In dissent, Judge Swygert maintained that the district court should
have conducted an evidentiary hearing in order to satisfy the statutory
requirement that it exercise a de novo review. He submitted that the
district court applied the wrong test, the substantial evidence test, when
it decided to grant summary judgment for the Secretary. Had the sub-
stantial evidence test been the proper standard, the district court's issu-
ance of summary judgment would have been correct, but since the
proper standard was de novo review and since issues calling for credi-
bility determinations were raised, the district court should have heard
live witnesses on these issues. Thus, Judge Swygert would have re-
versed the district court's grant of summary judgment and directed a de
novo review including an evidentiary hearing.10 5
If the Secretary of the Treasury's action in Stein's Inc. was indeed
based in part on a credibility resolution, the district court erred by
granting summary judgment since the evidence in the administrative
record was not "uncontroverted." To satisfy the statutory requirement
of de novo review, the district court should have made independent
credibility determinations which would have required that the plaintiff
be afforded an opportunity to testify before the district court. Accord-
ingly, Judge Swygert was probably correct in observing that the major-
ity permitted considerations of judicial economy to displace the
requirement of de novo judicial review.
Another case, American Diversofed Foods v. NLRB,10 6 raised fun-
damental questions concerning proper standards of judicial review.
Although the substantial evidence test is the proper standard of judicial
review of agency findings of fact when a public hearing is required by
the enabling statute, 0 7 the United States Supreme Court has author-
103. Id (citing Guilday v. United States Dep't of Justice, 385 F. Supp. 1096, 1098-99 (D. Del.
1974)).
104. 649 F.2d at 467. In the court's view, the district court's decision constituted a de novo
review without the introduction of additional evidence, since no presumptions of correctness were
necessarily afforded the agency's action. The district court was free in its review of the record to
give the agency's findings the weight it believed they deserved. Id at 466-67.
105. Id at 471.
106. 640 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1981).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224
(1973).
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ized use of another test when the courts review agency application of
law to facts in a given case. This later test, known as the "rational
basis" test, was announced by the Court in NLRB v. Hearst Publica-
tions, Inc. 108 There, the Labor Board had determined that newsboys
were "employees" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act, but a court of appeals, after an independent analysis of the issue,
had held the newsboys were not employees. The Supreme Court rein-
stated the Labor Board's decision, stating in relevant part:
[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad statu-
tory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the stat-
ute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is
limited .... [T]he Board's determination that specified persons are
"employees" under this Act is to be accepted if it has "warrant in the
record" and a reasonable basis in law.' °
This "rational basis" test is applicable to so-called mixed questions of
law and fact and is presumably different from the substantial evidence
test which is applied to purely factual questions."l0
InAmerican Diversfed Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, I I the court reviewed
a Labor Board determination that two shift managers, who were admit-
tedly discharged for union activity, were "employees" within the mean-
ing of the National Labor Relations Act."12 Apparently, there was no
dispute as to the essential facts. Nevertheless, the court applied the
substantial evidence test, drew its own inferences from the uncontested
facts, and substituted its viewpoint for that of the Labor Board, con-
cluding that the shift managers were "supervisors" rather than employ-
ees and thus not protected by the statute.' 3
In American Diversfed Foods, the court failed to properly charac-
terize the issue. Like the issue in Hearst, the issue in this case was
mixed, that is, calling for the application of a broad statutory term
(here, as in Hearst, "employee") to given facts. Accordingly, the court
should have applied the rational basis test rather than the substantial
evidence test which is appropriate where the issue is purely factual. In-
stead, it failed to accord proper deference to the Labor Board's experi-
ence in administering the statute and ignored the reminder in Hearst
108. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). See also Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cer.
denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
109. 322 U.S. at 131.
110. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 643-44 (1976).
111. 640 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1981).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
113. 640 F.2d at 897. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976). Even under the substantial evidence
test, the court may not reject reasonable inferences drawn by the agency from uncontested facts.
K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATrVE LAW TExT § 29.05 (3d ed. 1972).
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that the responsibility of defining the term "employee" was delegated
primarily to the agency experts with whom Congress had entrusted the
administration of the statute.
Judicial Deference to Agency Facfinding
Many of the remaining cases in which the court reviewed agency
action raised questions of the proper deference the court should afford
the factual findings of an administrative law judge (ALJ) in applying
the substantial evidence test. In the landmark decision of Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 1I4 the Supreme Court explained the duty of
the courts of appeals when reviewing orders issued by the Labor Board.
In its discussion, the Court indicated that a reviewing court should con-
sider the trial examiner's (ie., the factfinder's) report in determining
whether or not the agency is supported by substantial evidence on the
record taken as a whole. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court,
emphasized that "[niothing in the statutes suggests the Labor Board
should not be influenced by the examiner's opportunity to observe the
witnesses he hears and sees and the Board does not. Nothing suggests
that reviewing courts should not give to the examiner's report such pro-
bative force as it intrinsically commands." 15 Later in the opinion, Jus-
tice Frankfurter added: "The findings of the examiner are to be
considered along with the consistency and inherent probability of testi-
mony. The significance of his report, of course, depends largely on the
importance of credibility in the particular case."'"16
In most cases decided by the Seventh Circuit, the court deferred to
the factfinder where his findings were based in part on credibility reso-
lutions. 117 In NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equipment Co. ,118 the court re-
jected a challenge to an ALJ's findings of fact, stating, "Credibility
determinations, including assessments of demeanor, are for the ALJ
and the Board, not for a reviewing court."' 19 And in Bibbs v. Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare, 20 the court upheld an ALJ's credi-
bility resolution as to the claimant's representations about his pain. In
the latter case, the court indicated that "there is nothing improper in
114. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
115. Id at 495.
116. Id at 496.
117. Bibbs v. Secretary of HEW, 626 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Mars'Sales & Equip.
Co., 626 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1980).
118. 626 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1980).
119. Id at 571-72.
120. 626 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1980).
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the AL's reliance upon his own observations during the hearing."' 21
However, in one case, Midwest Stock Exchange, Inc. v. NLRB, 122
an ALJ did not fare as well at the hands of the Seventh Circuit. Devi-
ating from its deferential approach in the preceding cases, the court
downgraded the significance of a factfinder's observations of demeanor
and freely substituted its viewpoint for that of the ALJ. In that case,
the court's treatment of a Labor Board ALJ bordered on outright hos-
tility. For example, the court quipped that the AL's use of the word
"whopping" to describe a number of overtime hours was "more often
found in journalism than in legal writing,"' 2 3 and "[tjhe word 'whop-
ping' thus has become a meaningless cliche ... ," 124 The court also
rejected the AL's pivotal credibility resolutions which led to his find-
ings that several employees were targeted for dismissal by the company
because they had placed their names on a list of union adherents. In a
rare reference to an ALJ by name, the court stated that he "appears to
have followed his penchant for crediting testimony like that a sister
court has characterized as incredible."' 25 Inexplicably, the court later
upheld another of the same AL's findings, based on a credibility reso-
lution, that a supervisor had congratulated another employee for being
on a "hit list" and that the supervisor then agreed with the employee
that management would try to discharge all employees on the union list
although it would take time to do so. ' 26 In another portion of its opin-
ion, the court remarked, "We find that the evidence and testimony in
the record supporting the above findings are substantial, although
weak."' 27 The correctness of this approach is doubtful.
The opinion in Midwest Stock Exchange is open to serious criti-
cism. It appears to be inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit's approach
in other recent cases, such as Mars Sales & Equipment Co. and Bibbs, in
which the court relied heavily on the AL's observations of witness de-
meanor. This decision also seems internally inconsistent, adopting
some of the ALJ's findings without explaining why those findings were
more acceptable than those rejected by the court. But the most distres-
sing feature of this opinion is the court's resort to argumentum ad
hominem when reviewing the ALJ's credibility resolutions. In sum, the
121. Id at 528.
122. 635 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1980).
123. Id at 1260.
124. Id
125. Id at 1263 (citing Delco Remy Div. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir. 1979)).
126. 635 F.2d at 1266.
127. Id
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tone and substance of this opinion stray from the usually thoughtful
and temperate approach of the Seventh Circuit.
Other Dficulties with Judicial Review
Further complexities associated with judicial review are illustrated
by two cases reviewing actions of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, Farmland Industries Inc. v. United States, 28 and Assure Competi-
tive Transportation, Inc. v. United States.12 9 In Farmland, the ICC
published a new policy modifying its criteria for deciding railroad
abandonment applications, and in Assure, the ICC published modified
criteria for deciding motor carrier applications. Both cases address the
question of proper characterization of an ICC promulgation, that is,
whether it is a statement of policy or a rule.' 30 The opinions seem to
conclude that the proper scope of judicial review for policy statements
is different from the scope of review for rules. In the court's view, the
proper judicial role in reviewing a policy statement is to determine that
the policy is not arbitrary and capricious, but when reviewing a rule,
the proper judicial role is to determine whether the rule is supported by
substantial evidence. '31
The proper scope of judicial review of a rule which is the product
of the informal rulemaking process is to determine whether the agency
action is arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit has pointed out: "This standard of review is a
highly deferential one. It presumes agency action to be valid. More-
over, it forbids the court's substituting its judgment for that of the
agency and requires affirmance if a rational basis exists for the agency's
decision."' 32 While the content of the arbitrary and capricious formula
has changed over time 33 and today has variant meanings, 34 there is no
128. 642 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1981).
129. 635 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1980).
130. See 642 F.2d at 210; 635 F.2d at 1307.
131. 642 F.2d at 210, 635 F.2d at 1307.
132. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)
(footnotes omitted). See also National Tire Dealers & Retread Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 35
n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Review of informal agency rulemaking is governed by the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)-
(D) (1976), as well as by the arbitrary and capricious standard found in § 706(2)(A). Thus the
agency action will be scrutinized for constitutionality, statutory authority, and procedural regular-
ity. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d at 33-34.
133. Compare Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935) (presumption of
regularity in agency action), with Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971) ("thorough, probing, in-depth review").
134. See generally Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976).
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basis in the cases for concluding that the substantial evidence test is the
proper standard of review, absent express statutory directive.' 35 The
substantial evidence test should only be applied in those cases where
the regulatory statute expressly requires it, or where agency action is
based on adjudicatory procedures. 36
It may be that the Seventh Circuit's uncertainty stems from the
Supreme Court's opinion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 137 and a misreading of the leading case on the proper scope of
review of ICC decisions. 38 In Overton Park, the Court did say that the
substantial evidence test was the proper standard of review for rules.139
However, it is clear that the Court meant rules developed through for-
mal, on-the-record rulemaking,' 4° and not through the more common
notice and comment rulemaking procedures. '4 1 In Bowman Transpor-
tation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. ,142 cited in Assure, the
Seventh Circuit said that in determining the legality of newly devel-
oped standards a court must find that the standards were not an arbi-
trary and capricious interpretation of the statutory mandate of the
agency. 143 There was no issue in that case as to the proper characteri-
zation of the ICC promulgation as a policy or rule, and the use of the
substantial evidence test was limited to a stipulation that the factual
support for the rule was substantial.1'" In Farmland and Assure, the
Seventh Circuit treated the issue as one of characterization and not as
one requiring a determination of how much deference to give to an
agency's choice of competing interpretations of its statute. To properly
analyze the issue, the court should have broken it into three separate
questions: (1) does the agency have authority to act in this general
area?' 45 (2) if the agency has "area authority", is the choice it made a
reasoned choice based on a consideration of available options and
counterproposals?'4 and (3) how much factual support is needed to
135. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
136. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
137. Id
138. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974).
139. 401 U.S. at 415.
140. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1976).
141. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978); G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
133 (2d ed. 1980).
142. 419 U.S. 281 (1974).
143. Id at 284.
144. Id at 288.
145. See, e.g., NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
146. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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sustain the agency determinations? 147
BARRIERS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Separation of powers requires that in certain circumstances the
courts forego judicial review altogether. 48 When the request for re-
view is premature, 49 the person requesting review is not sufficiently
affected to warrant review, 50 or it appears that Congress has given the
agency broad discretion,' 5' courts often refrain from review. The re-
mainder of this survey will review cases discussing these barriers to
judicial review.
Ripeness for Review
In Farmland and Assure, discussed in the preceding section, the
Seventh Circuit ignored the question of the timing of judicial review.
In both cases no enforcement action had been taken by the ICC, and if
the promulgations were only statements of policy, they had no immedi-
ate legal effect.' 52 Thus, a question of timeliness or ripeness for review
was present. The concept of ripeness for judicial review has been de-
veloped to "prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudi-
cation, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and
its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties."' 153 State-
ments of policy, however, often have a significant practical effect on
regulated entities, even though the policy statements do not have the
force and effect of law. Such statements of policy may be reviewed
prior to enforcement action when a court is persuaded that the policy is
ripe for judicial review. To determine ripeness for review the courts
evaluate the fitness of the issues for judicial determination and the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. 54 When
dealing with policy statements, the courts will find the policy statement
ripe for review if there is an immediate and substantial effect on the
147. See, e.g., id.
148. See general,y Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
149. National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
150. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
151. Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970).
152. 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 76-78 (2d ed. 1979).
153. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
154. Id at 148.
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regulated entities. 155 In Farmland and Assure, the court did not even
discuss the question of ripeness which is usually considered jurisdic-
tional as an element of a "case or controversy."
Primary Jurisdiction
During the period of this survey, primary jurisdiction was the sub-
ject of two cases decided by the Seventh Circuit. The issue of primary
jurisdiction usually arises in a suit by one private litigant against an-
other. When both a court and an agency have jurisdiction over a mat-
ter, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction determines whether the court
or the agency should make the initial decision. The court will usually
defer to agency jurisdiction if enforcement of the private claim involves
a factual question that requires expertise that the courts do not have or
involves an area where a uniform determination is desirable. 56
In United States v. Elrod,157 the federal government sued a local
grantee of Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funds
for failure to comply with the contractual terms and conditions of a
grant. The original complaint alleged only violations of prisoners'
eighth and fourteenth amendment rights. In United States v. Solo-
mon,15 8 the Fourth Circuit had held that the United States was without
standing to bring a fourteenth amendment action on behalf of patients
in a mental institution. 59 Relying on Solomon, the district court in
Elrod held that the United States was without standing to bring the
fourteenth amendment action on behalf of prisoners. The government
then amended its complaint to include the breach of contract claims
mentioned above. Specifically, the complaint alleged over-crowding
and inadequate sanitation and visitation opportunities at the prison fa-
cilities. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the district court
judge stayed the judicial proceedings and ordered the United States
Department of Justice to adjudicate the claims in the amended com-
plaint before the LEAA, pursuant to statutory hearing procedures.
Those procedures require notice and a hearing to determine whether an
applicant or grantee is in compliance with the statute, regulations or
specific grant agreements.160
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in
155. Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970).
156. See generally Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
157. 627 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1980).
158. 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977).
159. Id at 1123.
160. 627 F.2d at 816.
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applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction because the agency itself
was the plaintiff. In so ruling, the court followed its earlier case, ICC v.
All-American, Inc. ,161 and relied upon the views of Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis. According to Professor Davis, the doctrine of primary ju-
risdiction should be invoked when the court is principally concerned
with acquainting itself with the agency's views. Accordingly, it is un-
necessary to invoke the doctrine when the agency itself is before the
court. 162 The court also reasoned that the issue of compliance with
standards 'is one traditionally within the purview of judicial compe-
tence, and unlike issues involving the reasonableness of agency stan-
dards, no deference to the agency was necessary. Moreover, the court
expressed doubt as to whether there were adequate administrative pro-
cedures by which the agency could proceed were it given the matter to
adjudicate. The court also noted that the statutory procedures were
only available for applicants and grantees, and not for institutions such
as the defendant correctional institution. 63 The court concluded,
"Where no administrative remedy exists, the doctrine of primary juris-
diction does not apply." 164
During the period of the survey, the Seventh Circuit decided a sec-
ond case involving the issue of primary jurisdiction. In Norfolk &
Western Railway v. B. Holser & Co. ,165 the railroad was attempting to
recover undercharges on the shipment of grain from grain elevators to
the east coast. The applicable tariff prescribed a lower charge for ten-
car shipments, as opposed to single car shipments. This lower charge
reflected the lower costs due to reduced switching from elevator sidings
when ten-car loads are shipped. According to the tariff, the reduced
rate would not be available to a shipper whose disability required the
originating railroad fine to switch more than one "cut"'166 of cars to the
shipper's facility.
Before the district court, the railroad alleged that it had un-
dercharged for shipments involving less than ten cars. Although there
was frequently space for ten cars, for the convenience of the railroad
less than ten cars were loaded. An inspector for the ICC informed the
parties that under the circumstances the ten-car rate was not proper.
Thus, according to the ICC, the shippers had been undercharged.
161. 505 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1974).
162. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19.02 at 14 n.41 (1958).
163. 627 F.2d at 818.
164. Id
165. 629 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
166. A cut is defined as a quantity of cars delivered to or removed from the track or tracks at
one location at one time. Id at 487.
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However, the district court interpreted the tariff provision in favor of
the shippers, concluding that the railroad had not undercharged
them. 67
The railroad appealed, arguing that the district court erroneously
based its ruling on matters properly within the primary jurisdiction of
the ICC. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the
district court. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction would not apply unless the disputed tariff was so
technical thit the agency's expertise would better enable it to interpret
the term than the court or unless it was necessary to examine the cost
allocation underlying the tariff. The Seventh Circuit concluded that
neither of these conditions existed in the instant case, although it ne-
glected to analyze the tariff issue.
When faced with the issue of primary jurisdiction, a court is essen-
tially concerned with the proper allocation of power between the court
and the agency. However, a review of the two cases decided by the
Seventh Circuit during the period of this survey suggests that resort to
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was unnecessary. A close analysis
of Elrod and Norfolk & Western reveals that those cases did not involve
the issue of primary jurisdiction.
In Elrod, the significant question was not one of primary jurisdic-
tion, but both a question of the authority of the Justice Department to
sue and one of exhaustion of administrative remedies. All of the issues
could be resolved by finding that the Justice Department had a cause of
action and that there were no administrative remedies to exhaust.
In Norfolk & Western, the court's analysis contains several flaws.
Assuming arguendo that primary jurisdiction exists, the court probably
erred in its analysis. The tariff terms were subject to disputed technical
interpretations, and the ultimate correctness of the interpretation
turned on the cost allocation underlying the ten-car rule. Thus, if the
doctrine exists and were applied, the matter should first have been re-
solved by the agency with expertise and experience in such cost
allocation.
In Norfolk & Western, the plaintiff railroad companies sued to re-
cover alleged shipping undercharges. Yet these same plaintiffs raised
the issue of primary jurisdiction before the Seventh Circuit. Just as
primary jurisdiction should not be invoked when the agency is the
plaintiff, it should not be applied when the plaintiff raises it.168
167. Id at 488.
168. The court also found that the shippers had asked for and had space for ten cars, but it
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In fact, no case needs to be analyzed as one of primary jurisdic-
tion. 169 All such cases raise one or more other questions that permit
more direct and sound disposition: (1) Is there a private right of ac-
tion? If not, the court has no jurisdiction. If so, the agency has no
jurisdiction. 170 (2) Has there been abrogation of statutory or common
law causes of action by the enabling statute? If not, the court has juris-
diction and the agency does not. This is because the plaintiff is exercis-
ing its choice of remedies, not because remedies are unavailable from
the agency. If so, there is no jurisdiction in the court.' 7' (3) Has there
been a federal preemption? If not, the state cause of action can pro-
ceed. If so, there is no state cause of action. 172 (4) Has the agency the
authority to immunize otherwise illegal action? Other questions must
be decided if this is answered in the affirmative, that is, has the agency
had the opportunity to exercise the power and has it granted the immu-
nity? If the answer to either is no, then the court has jurisdiction, and
there is nothing for the agency to decide. If the answers to the ques-
tions are affirmative, then there is no cause of action for the court to
hear.' 73 (5) Are there agency remedies that the legislature intended be
exhausted? If not, the court can proceed. If so, the court has no
jurisdiction. 174
In each of these five circumstances, either the court or the agency
has jurisdiction, not both. Therefore, there is no need to decide which
of the two bodies should proceed first. Eliminating the rubric "primary
jurisdiction" would clarify the real issues summarized above. The fact
that these classes of cases concern different conceptual problems and
are unrelated to a determination of which body (court or agency)
should proceed, is illustrated by three cases decided by the Seventh
Circuit.
In Mite Corp. v. Dixon,175 the court discussed federal preemption
of state causes of action. Illinois has empowered its Secretary of State
to pass upon the substantive fairness of a tender offer to purchase stock
and to prohibit the offer if it is determined at a hearing to be inequita-
ble. Mite Corp. made a tender offer for the stock of Chicago Rivet &
was the carrier's convenience that led the carrier to provide less than ten cars. From that perspec-
tive, a finding by the ICC that the ten-car rate did not apply could appear to the court to be
obviously incorrect.
169. But see Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973).
170. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
171. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
172. Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
173. Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
174. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
175. 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), prob. jukrf noted, 451 U.S. 968 (1981).
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Machine Co., an Illinois corporation. At the same time, Mite brought
an action in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of
the Illinois Business Take-Over Act 76 on the ground that federal legis-
lation preempted state authority to regulate tender offers. While deter-
mining whether a state statute is void under the supremacy clause is
notoriously complicated, the Seventh Circuit noted that "over the years
the general tests to be applied. . . have become reasonably well estab-
lished."' 177 The court quoted the Supreme Court's summary of these
rules:
The first inquiry is whether Congress, pursuant to its power to regu-
late commerce has prohibited state regulation of the particular as-
pects of commerce involved . . . . [Wlhen Congress has
"unmistakably ordained," that its enactments alone are to regulate a
part of commerce, state laws regulating that aspect of commerce
must fall. This result is compelled whether Congress' command is
explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its
structure and purpose.
Congressional enactments that do not exclude all state legisla-
tion in the same field nevertheless override state laws with which
they conflict . . . .[The] task is "to determine whether, under the
circumstances . . [the state's] law stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."178
While questioning that delay is necessarily undesirable, the court
held that a policy balance had been struck by Congress in this area 79
and that the court should not second-guess such legislative judgment.
Thus, because of the delay caused by a state hearing on the fairness of
the tender offer, the court concluded that the Illinois act was preempted
by the federal law.'80
If there is a preemption in Mite Corp., there is no jurisdiction in a
court to consider a state based cause of action. If there is no preemp-
tion, the federal courts have no basis to interfere with a state cause of
action and thus must dismiss the suit.
Yhill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange'8 ' was an anti-
trust action challenging the anti-rebate rule of the New York Stock Ex-
change 8 2 (NYSE) in effect at that time. There was no question that the
anti-rebate rule was the result of a combination in restraint of trade,
176. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.51-.70 (1979).
177. 633 F.2d at 490.
178. Id (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977)).
179. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976).
180. 633 F.2d at 498.
181. 633 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 997 (1981).
182. Id at 66.
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violating the Sherman 8 3 and Clayton Acts. 184 The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934185 had been interpreted to permit the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to authorize actions by the NYSE other-
wise in violation of the antitrust laws, if they were integral and neces-
sary to effective operation of the nation's securities exchanges and
enforcement of the securities laws.' 86 The Seventh Circuit reviewed the
history of the anti-rebate rule and found it specifically approved by the
SEC as a necessary part of its regulatory policy. Therefore, the court
concluded the Exchange's actions were immune from suit under the
antitrust laws.
Under the circumstances in Thill, there is no jurisdiction in the
courts to maintain an antitrust action, and thus, it must be dismissed.
Had the agency not yet acted, the court would have had to dismiss to
permit the agency to determine the immunity question. This deferral
to the agency, however, does not require analysis of coordination or
agency expertise. Rather, it is necessary because of the agency's power
to act to preclude any court cause of action.
In Indiana Manufactured Housing Association v. FTC, 187 the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) had begun a rulemaking proceeding
pursuant to its authorizing statute. The presiding officer failed to make
findings as to the prevalence of the alleged false or misleading act or
practice. Review was sought prior to the FTC's determination of what
rule if any should be adopted. The Seventh Circuit held that the peti-
tioners had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and therefore ju-
dicial review was premature.
The petitioners' argument for an exception to the well-established
requirement of exhaustion was that failure to review now made the
alleged defect unreviewable, because section 18 of the FTC Act pro-
vides that "the contents and adequacy of any statement (of basis and
purpose supporting the adopted regulation) shall not be subject to judi-
cial review in any respect."' 88
The Seventh Circuit has recognized an exception to the exhaustion
requirement in cases in which judicial review effectively will be fore-
closed if the court chooses not to intervene in the administrative pro-
ceeding. 8 9 However, since the FTC had not decided that findings on
183. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
184. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1976).
186. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
187. 641 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1981).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(5)(C) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
189. See Jewel Companies v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1970).
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"prevalence" were required, the court concluded that "it should be the
first to consider the issue.'' 9° Further, section 18 indicates a congres-
sional intent to preclude all judicial review. Clearly the court had no
jurisdiction if the petitioners did not exhaust agency remedies. In this
case, the notion that only one entity has jurisdiction is reinforced by
section 18.
Standing to Sue
In Marshall & lsley Corp. v. Heimann,191 the Seventh Circuit dis-
cussed the question of who can obtain judicial review of agency action.
First Bank of LaCrosse bought Midland National Bank and operated it
as a new branch bank. These transactions were approved by the
Comptroller of the Currency of the United States. The plaintiffs, other
Wisconsin banks, alleged that the approval violated state and federal
statutory limitations on the establishment of branch banks by national
banks. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had no standing to
challenge the Comptroller's approval, and the district court found no
injury in fact and dismissed the suit. The Seventh Circuit found injury,
but concluded that the plaintiffs did not come within the zone of inter-
ests protected by the statutes relied upon. 92
This is one of the rare cases which has relied on the zone of inter-
est segment of the modem standing test to find no standing. 93 The
district court acknowledged that a "new" branch bank would create
injury in fact sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement, but saw the
situation in this case as presenting merely a change in ownership, not a
new bank. Thus the competitive circumstances did not change. The
Seventh Circuit more realistically recognized that a new owner (espe-
cially "an enormous bank holding company") 94 changed the competi-
tive environment, and found injury in fact.
The zone of interest requirement was first articulated by the
Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Comptroller of the Currency.195 There, the Court held that no
explicit statutory provision was necessary to confer standing so long as
the plaintiff was within the class of persons that the statutory provision
190. Indiana Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. FTC, 641 F.2d at 482. See Industrial Union Dep't
v. American Petroleum Inst., 444 U.S. 818 (1980).
191. 652 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1981).
192. Id at 698.
193. See K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 107 (6th ed. 1977). See also Tax Analysts & Advo-
cates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
194. 652 F.2d at 692.
195. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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was designed to protect. This requirement was characterized as a "rule
of self-restraint," not required by the Constitution. 96
Courts, including the district court below, have held that the zone
of interest requirement is no longer viable.' 97 However, the Seventh
Circuit "consistently has required satisfaction of the zone of interests
test for standing."' 198 This approach requires a precise delineation of
the interests protected by a statute, followed by a factual determination
of whether the plaintiff is within those interests. The Seventh Circuit
has described a narrow range of interests in defining the zone. 199 It
seems fair to characterize the court's approach as miserly. 2°° The focus
is less on the competing interests and values subsumed in the statutory
compromise, and more on the effect of permitting a challenge to the
agency's program.20' Clearly this is inconsistent with the "trend...
toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest administra-
tive action. '20 2 Further, assuming that zone of interest is part of the
standing text, it need not be applied in every case, as it is purely a self-
imposed restraint. To use it both invariably and as a justification to
require particular matching of injury and interest seems doubly wrong.
Reviewability
The Administrative Procedure Act incorporates the general rule
that judicial review shall be available "except to the extent that (1) stat-
utes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law."' 203 Few statutes expressly provide for a pre-
clusion of judicial review,2°4 and those that do are narrowly interpreted
to provide at least some judicial review.20 5 Even less common are judi-
cial determinations of implied statutory preclusion of judicial re-
196. Id at 154.
197. See, e.g., Florida v. Weinberger, 492 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1974); Park View Heights Corp. v.
Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972).
198. 652 F.2d at 693.
199. Id The District of Columbia Circuit has also followed this approach. See Control Data
Corp. v. Baldridge, 655 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
200. See, e.g., 652 F.2d at 694. "In order to fall within the zone of interests ... plaintiffs must
represent the particular competitive interest addressed by the statute." Id
201. See, e.g., id at 696. "If other banks were allowed to challenge the Comptroller's determi-
nation ... the objectives justifying these emergency procedures could be thwarted by the purely
selfish desires of competitors to keep a new competitor out of the local banking community." Id
at 696-97.
202. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Currency, 397 U.S.
at 154. See aLso Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
203. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976).
204. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 942 (7th ed. 1979) [herein-
after cited as GELLHORN].
205. Arnolds v. Veterans' Administration, 507 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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view.206 The intent of the drafters of the Administrative Procedure Act
and the current view of the Supreme Court, as expressed in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 20 7 concerning the proper interpre-
tation of the second exception (L e., "action. . . committed to agency
discretion") is that it applies only in the very limited circumstances
where "statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case
there is no law to apply ... 208
Since Overton Park, many courts have adopted the "no law to ap-
ply" test.209 That this is an overreaction to the complexity of the prior
law210 and an oversimplification of the Supreme Court's views is indi-
cated by the Court's recent decision in Southern Railway v. Seaboard
Allied Milling Corp. ,211 where it considered the language of the statute,
the determinations placed within the statutory design of the enabling
act, the legislative history, and case law interpreting analogous statutes
in deciding the question of reviewability.
During the period under study, the Seventh Circuit considered two
cases that cited the "no law to apply" test: Laketon Asphalt Refining,
Inc. v. Department of the Interior,212 and United States v. Winthrop
Towers.213 Laketon Asphalt Re.fining concerned mineral deposits on
federal lands. The United States owns vast acreage containing deposits
of oil and gas. Section 36 of the Mineral Leasing Act 21 4 provides that
royalty payments to the United States under oil and gas leases shall, on
demand of the Secretary of Interior, be paid in oil and gas. The Secre-
tary in turn sells to the highest bidder the royalty oil and gas not
needed by the United States. Because this practice resulted in purchase
domination by the larger refiners, Congress amended the Act to pro-
vide for oil preference allocations to refiners without their own sources
206. GELLHORN, supra note 203, at 939.
207. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
208. 401 U.S. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)).
209. See, e.g., Ness Inv. Corp. v. Department of Agriculture, 512 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1975);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974).
210. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967), which articulated a strong presumption of reviewability, the law was so complex that a
widely cited article listed nine "factors" which most often shape decisions that review be denied:
(1) broad agency discretion; (2) expertise required to comprehend subject matter; (3) managerial
nature of agency; (4) impropriety of court intervention; (5) desirability of informal agency action;
(6) lack of judicial ability to insure "correct" result; (7) need for expedition; (8) large number of
potentially appealable agency orders; (9) availability of other limitations on agency discretion.
Saferstein, Nonreviewability. A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion", 82
HARV. L. REv. 367, 380-95 (1968).
211. 442 U.S. 444 (1979).
212. 624 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1980).
213. 628 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980).
214. 30 U.S.C. § 192 (1976).
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of supply. 215 In administering this program, the Department of Inte-
rior divided the country into five geographic areas. Refiners in each
area were given preferences for the purchase of royalty oil produced in
their area. This policy was promulgated as a final regulation without
notice and opportunity to comment, pursuant to the exception to the
notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act, for matters pertaining to "agency management or personnel or to
public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts. '21 6 Laketon
Asphalt was a non-preference purchaser of royalty oil from the north-
ern Rocky Mountain area, an area from which it had purchased much
royalty oil prior to the challenge to the regulations.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the Department of the Interior on
both procedural and substantive grounds. In so doing it rejected the
argument that the Secretary's geographic allocation of royalty oil was
not subject to judicial review as it is committed by law to agency discre-
tion. The court found that the language of the statutory provision2 7
limited the Secretary's discretion to allocate the oil among eligible re-
finers in the area in which the oil was produced. Had a proposed form
of the Act been adopted which gave the Secretary "complete discretion
...to determine to whom the oil should be sold in accordance with his
findings as to how the public interest would best be served, '218 it might
have been one of "those rare instances where there is no law to apply
and thus no review by the court would have been possible." 219
Winthrop Towers220 involved an action on behalf of the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to foreclose a federally
insured mortgage. The district court granted HUD's motion for sum-
mary judgment because, in the absence of law to apply, judicial review
215. Id
216. 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2) (1976). This is a much criticized provision, see Sinaiko, Due Process
Rights of Participation in Administrative Rulemaking, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 886 (1975), but Congress
has not as yet seen fit to change it.
217. As amended, the statute reads, in pertinent part:
Provided, That inasmuch as the public interest will be served by the sale of royalty oil to
refineries not having their own source of supply for crude oil, the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, when he determines that sufficient supplies of crude oil are not available in the open
market to such refineries, is authorized and directed to grant preference to such refineries
in the sale of oil under the provisions of this section, for processing or use in such refin-
eries and not for resale in kind. . . .Providedfurther, That in selling such royalty oil the
Secretary of the Interior may at his discretion prorate such oil among such refineries in
the area in which the oil is produced.
30 U.S.C. § 192 (1976).
218. S. REP. No. 566, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945).
219. Laketon Asphalt Refining, Inc. v. Department of the Interior, 624 F.2d 784, 794 n.17 (7th
Cir. 1980).
220. 628 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980).
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of the agency's action was not available. Specifically, the district court
had found that there were no standards or limits against which to re-
view the agreed authority of HUD to foreclose. The Seventh Circuit
reversed this determination and found that such a standard or limit,
sufficient to permit review, was set out in section 2 of the National
Housing Act.22'
This test of non-reviewability, ie., "no law to apply," raises ques-
tions about the delegation doctrine. InA.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States,222 the Supreme Court found that section 3 of the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act 223 was an insufficient standard to canal-
ize the administrator's discretion, and therefore the statute was
unconstitutional. 224 Perhaps the courts should revive a stricter delega-
tion doctrine and find statutes unconstitutional where there is "no law
to apply" rather than do the opposite and find agency action unreview-
able under a grant of unlimited discretion.225 In this regard the
Supreme Court decision in, Southern Railway,22 6 while retaining the
"no law to apply" test, seems to have returned to a more defensible
rationale, requiring consideration of other factors.
INSPECTIONAL AUTHORITY
One of the most important powers of regulatory agencies con-
cerned with the public health and safety is the power to inspect the
facilities of the regulated entity. Originally it was held that such in-
221. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). This section sets out in detail the national housing policy. Inter-
estingly, the court stated that the language was not "precatory." United States v. Winthrop Tow-
ers, 628 F.2d 1028, 1035 (7th Cir. 1980). The word precatory is defined as "having the nature of
prayer, request, or entreaty; conveying or embodying a recommendation or advice or the expres-
sion of a wish, but not a positive command or direction." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1059 (5th
ed. 1979). The notion that particular statutory language is precatory has been raised in attacks on
broad law or societal reform statutes. For instance, in Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d
1277 (7th Cir. 1977), public transit companies argued unsuccessfully that the language of section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974,29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), was precatory. Section 504 provides
in part that "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
More recently, in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), however,
it was successfully argued that the language of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6011 (1976), was precatory.
222. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
223. 48 Stat. 195 (1933), as amended by Act of June 14, 1935, ch. 246, 49 Stat. 375 (1935)
(declared unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
224. The language of this section seems similar to the language of the National Housing Act,
and the other statutes discussed in note 221 supra. It is difficult to discern a principled basis for
distinguishing between statutory language which is precatory, not precatory, or unconstitutional
for giving insufficient guidance to an agency administrator.
225. See Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 582-86 (1972).
226. 442 U.S. 444 (1979).
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spections were not searches subject to the fourth amendment. 227 Then
it was determined that they were searches, but that diminished prob-
able cause based on a reasonable periodic pattern of inspection would
satisfy the fourth amendment's requirement.228 This relaxed approach
is sufficiently vague that questions concerning its meaning have since
been brought to the Supreme Court at least six times229 and continue to
challenge lower courts, including the Seventh Circuit.
In Burkart Randall Division of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall,230 a
corporation filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief prohibit-
ing an Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) officer
from inspecting one of its facilities. The plaintiff corporation con-
tended that the probable cause standard applied by the district court in
granting the OSHA inspection warrant was in error. Burkart argued
that the criminal probable cause standard should be met, not the more
relaxed administrative probable cause standard. Alternatively, the cor-
poration argued that if this more relaxed standard had been applied,
the warrant application failed to satisfy it. Finally, the corporation
maintained that the warrant was invalid because of its overbroad
scope, permitting an inspection of the entire premises rather than being
limited to those areas specifically related to the complaint.
The Seventh Circuit in Burkart first addressed the issue of which
standard of probable cause was appropriate, the flexible administrative
standard or the criminal standard. Citing several Supreme Court cases
which have held that probable cause in the criminal law sense is not
required,23' the court in Burkart held that the administrative probable
cause standard was to be applied in the issuance of a warrant for an
OSHA inspection based on employee complaints. The court acknowl-
edged that criminal probable cause is required when there is a possibil-
ity that an administrative investigation may be criminal in nature, for
example, when fire officials investigate a possible arson. However, such
was not the case in Burkart.
In dealing with the corporation's alternative argument, that the ev-
idence was insufficient to establish even administrative probable cause,
227. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
228. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
229. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311
(1972); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72 (1970).
230. 625 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1980).
231. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). See also In re Establishment Inspection of Gilbert &
Bennett Mfr. Co., 589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884 (1979).
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the court held that the sworn warrant application, submitted by the
OSHA compliance officer sufficiently informed the magistrate of the
substance of the employee complaints. The magistrate was thus able to
exercise independent judgment as to whether an inspection was justi-
fied, "rather than acting as a mere rubber stamp validating the decision
already reached by the Secretary of Labor. ' 232 The warrant applica-
tion was sufficiently detailed and specific in its description of the con-
tents of the employee complaint to "satisfy the 'specific evidence'
manner of establishing probable cause." 233
The court also rejected the corporation's objection to the issuance
of the inspection warrant because it was based on unwritten complaints
employees. The court held that there is no statutory requirement or
judicial interpretation preventing OSHA from determining that an in-
spection is justified on the basis of an informal employee complaint.
The court also disposed of the corporation's assertion that the warrant
application did not satisfy the requirement of "specific evidence of an
existing violation" 234 due to the lapse of time between" OSHA's receipt
of the employee complaints and the issuance of the warrant. The court
held that where "the nature of the alleged conditions makes reasonable
the conclusion that violations of the Act remained on Burkart's prem-
ises at the time of the warrant application, '235 such a warrant should be
issued authorizing an OSHA inspection.
Finally, the court in Burkart discussed the issue of whether a war-
rant authorizing an OSHA inspection should be limited to the areas
identified in the employee complaints. The court held that such an in-
spection "need not be limited in scope to the substance of those com-
plaints. ' 236 Rather,
in light of the broad remedial purposes of the Act, the strong federal
interest in employee health and safety, and the protections provided
by the warrant requirement, it will generally be reasonable in such a
case to conduct an OSHA inspection of the entire workplace identi-
fied in the complaints.237
Although there may be exceptions in extraordinary circumstances, this
was not such a case. Accordingly, the court in Burkart upheld the dis-
trict court's issuance of a warrant to inspect the plaintiff corporation's
232. 625 F.2d at 1319.
233. Id at 1321.
234. Id at 1322.
235. Id
236. Id at 1325.
237. Id at 1325-26.
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premises by an OSHA compliance officer.238
Judge Wood dissented, finding nothing "anomalous 239 in distin-
guishing between "neutral" periodic area inspections which presuppose
some general finding of necessity, and non-neutral inspections pro-
voked by complaints. "Neutral" inspections need be supported by less
than traditional probable cause and are limited in scope to the jurisdic-
tions of the agency. Inspections resulting from complaints require
more probable cause and are limited to areas complained about. 240
The constant tension in administrative inspection cases is between
a pragmatic awareness that health and safety standards can only be
enforced on a random audit basis and the strict probable cause require-
ments of the fourth amendment. Here the majority of the court clearly
adopted a "flexible" 241 approach.
CONCLUSION
Many of the administrative law cases decided by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit during its 1980-81 term demonstrate the
complexity of judicial review of administrative agency decisions.
These cases exemplify the present confusion as to what standards of
review apply to each type of agency action, how intense scrutiny under
a given standard should be, and whether review of particular types of
actions should be available at all. This confusion has led to a lack of
predictability in these cases which works to the ultimate detriment of
the public and the regulated entities. A more standardized approach is
needed, but is unlikely to occur without legislative action.
238. Id at 1326.
239. Id at 1328 (Wood, J., disenting).
240. Id
241. Id at 1317.

